The Board has held that the right of an employer to insist upon a Board-directed election is not absolute. \'\There, as here, the Employer entertains no reasonable doubt either with respect to the appropri ateness of the proposed unit or the Union's representative status, and seeks a Board-directed election without a valid ground therefor, he has failed to fulfill the bargaining requirements under the Act.7
ESTABLISHMENT OF BARGAINING RIGHTS WITHOUT AN NLRB ELECTION
H
I. THE PRESENT STATE OF BoARD LAvv
The central question is this : May an employer, presented with a demand to recognize a union which claims to have obtained signed authorization cards from a majority of his employees in an appro priate unit, decline to extend recognition and insist instead on a
Labor Board election to determine the question of representation?
Put another way, may a union denied recognition claimed on the basis of a showing o£ cards seek bargaining rights through either an election or an unfair labor practice charge, as it prefers, or may the employer confine it to the election route? I would have given a somewhat different answer a year ago, but today it seems clear (al though perhaps for today only) that an employer ordinarily may in sist on an election, that the initial option is his rather than the union's. The 1961 decision in Snow & Sons6 seemed to suggest a far narrower employer privilege. The Board there specifically rejected the notion that an employer could insist on an election "because the employees might change their minds," and came close to holding that a refusal to recognize can be justified only by a doubt of present majority which has some objective warrant. It said:
The Board has held that the right of an employer to insist upon a Board-directed election is not absolute. \'\There, as here, the Employer entertains no reasonable doubt either with respect to the appropri ateness of the proposed unit or the Union's representative status, and seeks a Board-directed election without a valid ground therefor, he has failed to fulfill the bargaining requirements under the Act.7
Today, Snow has been confined to its particular facts (the em ployer reneged on his agreement after verifying the cards), continued reliance on it has been explicitly disapproved by the Board,8 and it� principles have in effect been largely overruled. While continuing to talk the language of good-faith doubt, the Board has given that term a meaning substantially different from its earlier one of ar actual particularized skepticism regarding the Union's present rna jority. This recent withdrawal is most clearly manifested, and it:
dimensions clarified, in the Strydel,9 Aaron Brothen10 and H. ir W 6. 134 N.L. R. B. 709 (1961 709 ( ), enforced, 308 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962 . 7. Id. at 710-11. In enfoTcing the BoaTel order in Snow, the court of appeal seemed to agree that the test is an objective one: "The manner in which a1
employer receives reliable information of union representation .. . is of no conse quence. Once he has received such information hom a reliable source, insistence up01 a Board election can no longer be defended on the ground of a genuine doubt as t• majority Te p resentation. " 308 F. 2d 687 , 692 ('lth Cir. 1962 INhere a company has engaged in substantial unfair labor practices calculated to dissipate union support, the Board, with the Courts' approval, has concluded that employer insistence on an election was not motivated by a good-faith doubt of the union's majority, but rather by a rejection of the collective-bargaining principle or by a desire to gain time within which to undermine the union.l'
Here too it seems that there has been a recent change in ra tionale. ·while the Board, as the preceding quotation acknowledges, has regularly used employer acts of coercion to infeT a lack of earlier , 359 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1966) , and cases there cited, and in my judgment there is no substantial basis for dispute regarding its validity. Objections about giving the union "two bites at the apple" hardly seem to prove much; after all, when the other fellow has put a worm in the apple, it is hardly going very far to allow a second bite. (This is not to say that there is not a problem raised by the issuance of an order requiring an employer to recognize a union that has lost an election; see the last paragraph of note 64, infra). tablish majority status, such a card may not be used at all; the loss to the union is minimal, and the safeguard against misunderstanding and misrepresentation is substantial.
"Where the language of the cards is unambiguous, the Board, under its well-known Cumberland Shoe24 doctrine, will apparently not entertain any claim of misunderstanding on the employees' part and will find misrepresentation sufficient to vitiate a card only when the solicitor has said in so many words that its only purpose is the securing of an election. Here the gTound is slippery indeed, for we are dealing with statements made in litigation occurring months after the events. For example, the Sixth Circuit upheld the validity of the cards challenged in the Cumberland case, relying (quite prop erly in my view) on the fact that the employees' testimony was given in response "to leading questions propounded by [employer] coun sel, upon cross-examination, as to whether they were told that the purpose of the cards was to secure an election."25 Obviously, an affirmative answer to such a question does not establish real misrep resentation. Contrast, however, the practice upheld by the Board and by a majority of the Second Circuit over Judge Timbers' strong dissent-in Gotham Shoe,26 where several employees testified to being told such things as "they wanted to get enough signatures on the cards so that if they got a majority of signatures, they could have an election," "they needed a certain per cent of the employees to sign cards in order to get a vote," and "signing of the card was for the purpose of getting an election and was not itself a vote." Here,
there is more than a suspicion that the employees in question were misled, whether deliberately or not. Yet the Board was content to note that the statements could be parsed consistently with the idea that one purpose of the cards was to secure bargaining rights.27
Moreover, the Board seems almost never to go beyond invalidating a particular card, once it finds misrepresentation or coercion.23 As a general matter, this may be unobjectionable, but there are cer tainly some circumstances which call for a broader reaction. On some occasions, invalidation of all cards obtained by a particular so licitor, or obtained on a particular form of card, or secured follow ing a particular letter found to misrepresent the impact of the cards, with its obligation to discourage abuses of the system.
III. THE EFFECT OF EMPLOYER UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES ON THE IssuANCE OF A BARGAINING ORDER

A. Employer Coercion as Proof of Bad Faith
The Board has been most successful in the courts of appeals in winning approval of its fairly uniform practice of basing a finding of lack of good faith doubt on employer unfair labor practices committed during the organizational campaign. The finding is said to be one of fact-did the employer doubt the union's majority?
and once the finding is made and upheld, the bargaining order can be routinely imposed and sustained as the obvious remedy for an unlawful refusal to bargain. While it may be wishful thinking to hope for the abandonment of a winning formula, it seems clear to me that the Board's rationale for its reliance on employer unfair labor practices should be discarded. The question is characteris tically put as whether the employer had a good faith doubt of the union's majority, or ·whether he rejected the collective bargaining principle and withheld Tecognition in order to gain time within which to undermine the union's majority. election, and then to campaign against the union in that election, it is perfectly clear that he is being permitted to reject the collective bargaining principle so long as his employees do not, by voting for the union, oblige him to accept it. It simply encourages hypocrisy to permit an employer to acknowledge his doubts, but not his hopes. Similarly, the notion that an employer may not deny recognition "in order to gain time during which to undennine the union's majority" is an unfortunate one. If taken seriously, it would result in deeming it irrelevant whether the employer's opposition to union ization took lawful or unlawful form, and regarding as critical the question whether the employer was seeking to dissipate an existing majority or to prevent the union from obtaining one. Yet precisely the reverse situation seems to prevail. The Board has explicitly de clined to rely on lawful anti-union conduct as a gTound for inferring that an initial refusal to recognize was unlawful.31 But the taking of this step, unless no more than an obeisance to the language of section 8(c),32 implies that a legitimate purpose of the election is not simply to ascertain the validity of the union's initial claim to represent a majority, but also to test the durability of that majority in the crucible of a pre-election campaign. Once that fact is acknowl edged, it seems obvious that it is entirely irrelevant to the legitimacy of the employer's conduct whether the union initially commanded a majority, which it hoped to hold through a campaign, or began with something less than fifty per cent support, which it hoped to augment.
B. The Bargaining Order as a Remedy
As suggested above,33 I believe that the Board has recently begun to acknowledge that the rationale-and perhaps the scope as well of its reliance on unfair labor practices may be misplaced. (1955) .
• lviichigan Law Review [Vol. 65:851 spite the presence of unfair labor practices, to infer an unlawful motive for the original refusal to recognize. It has recently empha sized the flexibility of its application of the "good faith" test,36 a flexibility which would be entirely appropriate (and would seem less capricious) were the question deemed to be the remedial adequacy of a rerun election as distinguished from a bargaining order. The agency has been given wide discretion over choice of remedy, but on such a shift in rationale it would need to persuade the courts of appeals that the stronger remedy was not chosen routinely or sim ply as a deterrent,37 but was appropriate in light of the specific setting of the particular acts of illegality involved. This would be all to the good, in my view, for just such considerations ought to determine the result now. A parallel should be recognized to those cases in which a bargaining order is sought as a remedy for section S(a)( l) or 8(a)(3) violations alone; indeed, it should be acknowl edged that, where an election has been held, the question whether there was an earlier improper refusal to recognize is a totally ab stract one and should be irrelevant to the result. 39. NL RB v. F1omatic Corp. , 347 F.2d 71 , 78 (2d Cir. 1965) , where the court reversed a post-election bargaining order to remedy a § S(a)(1) violation:
[C]ard majorities must by necessity be deemed evidence of the status quo ante where the employer's conduct has been so flagrantly hostile to the organizing efforts of a union that a secret election has undoubtedly been corrupted as a result of the employer's milit�nt opposition.
vyhere , as here , there was no such sustained broad-gauged campaign but only the mstance of a somewhat overstated reply to the union's charge, a bargaining order based on authorization Gtrcls in lieu of a secret election is less easily justifi ed. Nor can one responsibly invoke here the principle that inade quacies in one area of the Jaw should be treated directly, rather than by warping others-that two wrongs do not make a right.
We are talking about a single concern: remedies when the election process has been corrupted through coercion or discrimination.
vVhen the preferred method of determining employee wishes has been tampered with, it totally begs the question to say that em ployee rights are sacrificed by a bargaining order. Employee rights are affected whatever the result : If an inadequate rerun remedy is routinely applied, the rights of those employees who desire collec tive bargaining, and whose desires were met with violations of law, are not being protected; if a bargaining order is issued, the rights of those who oppose collective bargaining are being tramped on if -and I emphasize the "if"-a poll conducted after the effects of earlier coercion were satisfactorily dissipated 1vould indicate a union loss. Thus it is impossible to defend a refusal to impose a bargain ing order unless one is willing to defend the adequacy of the par ticular remedies in fact applied in connection with the decision to direct a second election. Perhaps, if the time comes when the Board has developed practical and workable rules regulating rerun elec tions, and they have been upheld by the courts, and are appl ied in more than the exceptional case, it will be appropriate to say that 46. Since the union's continued influence over the job and fate of the employees is largely contingent on its prevailing at the polls, an employee can ordinaril y shake free of its power by voting "no." (He will usually fmd the isolation and anonymitv of the pollin g booth sufficient to insul:lte him from union-generated prio r pressures). A "yes" vote, however, does not act as a similar insulator against employer pressu res; the employee is not voting for or against continuing his association "·ith the em ployer, and the latter's displeasure at the ou tcome of the vote will he a matter of continuing concern to the employee. bargammg orders should not be used as a remedy. It seems plain th at that time is not the present. Indeed, it would not be surprising if it were the use of the bargaining order which prompted the development of other remedies. It is not uncommon in legal regu lation for those who have been unwilling to take even a single sub stantial step to agree to do so once others begin to insist on taking two.
IV. THE AssERTED EMPLOYER RrcHT TO AN ELECTION
It is appropriate to face last the problem which raises the most 1\ 1 ichigan Law Review [Vol. 65 :851 history. As for the validity of elections, obviously the consistent affirmance of the appropriateness of compelling bargaining with an uncertified union bespeaks an awareness that elections too have some relevant infirmities. The problem is even more acute in the case of a rerun election made necessary by employer coercion or discrimina tion. It is important to bear in mind that an election is a far better cure for union than for employer misdeeds.46 And the fact remains that, in a regime where there has been just concern over the ade quacy of the remedial scheme,47 the simple notion of doing over again what has worked badly once is hardly a reassuring method of undoing the effects of the abortive attempt.
Nor can one responsibly invoke here the principle that inade quacies in one area of the law should be treated directly, rather than by warping others-that two wrongs do not make a right.
We are talking about a single concern : remedies when the election process has been corrupted through coercion or discrimination.
When the preferred method of determining employee wishes has been tampered with, it totally begs the question to say that em ployee rights are sacrificed by a bargaining order. Employee rights are affected whatever the result: If an inadequate rerun remedy is routinely applied, the rights of those employees who desire col1ec tive bargaining, and whose desires were met with violations of law, are not being protected; if a bargaining order is issued, the rights of those 'vho oppose collective bargaining are being tramped on if -and I emphasize the "if"-a poll conducted after the effects of earlier coercion were satisfactorily dissipated would indicate a union loss. Thus it is impossible to defend a refusal to impose a bargain ing order unless one is willing to defend the adequacy of the par ticular remedies in fact applied in connection with the decision to direct a second election. Perhaps, if the time comes when the Board has developed practical and workable rules regulating rerun elec tions, and they have been upheld by the courts, and are <�ppliecl in more than the exceptional case, it will be approp,·iate to s:1y that 46. Since the union's continued influence over the job and fate of the em ployccs is largely contingent on its prevailing at the polls, an employee can ordinarily shake free of its power by voting "no." (H e will usually find the isolation and anonymitY of the polling booth sufficient to insulate him from union-generated prior pressures).
A "yes" vote, however, does not act as a similar insulator against employer pressures; the employee is not voting for or against continuing his association '"ith the em ployer, and the latter's displeasure at the outcome of the Hltc will be a matter of con tinuing concern to the employee. 47. Sec. e.g., Sunco�DllrrEE ON NLRB, HousE Co:>.IMITTEE ON l:Dt.:C.·\T!O:\ A:\D LABOR 87th Cong., 1st Scss., Administmtion of the Labor-Manage111 ent Relations Act by the NLRB 20-2-1 (lOG!) (The Pucinski report); Bok, sujna note ·t 2, at 6·1-G:J. 1'2-1-25 ; 1\' ote, The Need for Crea tive Orders Un der Section JO(c) of the NLJU , 112 l'. 1'. ·\ . L. REv.
bargaining orders should not be used as a remedy. It seems plain that that time is not the present. Indeed, it would not be surprising if it were the use of the bargaining order which prompted the development of other remedies. It is not uncommon in legal regu lation for those who have been unwilling to take even a single sub stantial step to agree to do so once others begin to insist on taking rwo.
IV. THE AssERTED EMPLOYER RIGHT To AN ELECTION
It is appropriate to face last the problem which raises the most fundamental and controversial questions of underlying policy, al though-because of the prevalence of employer unfair labor prac tices during an organizing campaign-its practical importance may be substantially less. I refer of course to the right of an employer faced with a demand for recognition to insist on an election in the first place. I have suggested earlier that the Labor Board, after giv ing some indication of a rejection of any such general right, has re cently taken the view (or one which is in practice its near equivalent) that an employer may insist on an election.48 This position is favored by nearly everyone who has spoken to the question,49 and it can only be some deep-seated perversity that impels me to swim against so strong a current. Since I am about to do so, however, I
should be careful not to over-state my position. I am not so much convinced that an employer should not be permitted to insist on an election as I am wholly unconvinced by the arguments that I have seen or read in support of such a right. Do I fairly summarize the case for an employer's right to an election in these terms? ·what-48. The cases discussed above (see notes 9-15 sujJra and accompanying text) sug gest that an employer who meets a union demand for recognition with a laconic expression of scorn for authmization cards will not be held to have lacked a good faith doubt. Hence, I say that he may insist on an election. H & \V Constr. Co., 161 N.L.R.B. l'<o. 77, 2 LAB. REL. REP. (63 L.R.R.M.) 13-!6 (Nov. 13, 1966 ) the most recent decision, warns the garrulous and the unwary that it is only the assertion of a doubt regarding present majority, protected as it is by the lack of any requirement of objective substantiation, that confers this immunity. Apparen tly, an employer may not "waive" this doubt, ant! rely instead on a faith or hope that employees conceded to be presently in fa, or of unionization will (through lawful means) come to vote against it. See Member Zagoria's dissen t in H. & W., 2 L;.n. Ru .. REP. (63 L.R.R.M.) at 13-!9-50. (Perhaps the Board will construe H. & W. more narrowly, and hold that an employer may rely as well on this latter variety of doubt, provided he voices it in response to the union demand. Such a proviso would have little appea l, but it seems more troublesome yet to draw a line permitting an employer to obtain a future secret vote if he thinks a present secret vote would contradict a presen t cant-check but not if he thinks that only a future secret vote would have that effect.) ever the situation earlier, since 1947 it has not been the policy of the National Labor Relations Act to foster and promote union or ganization, and the Labor Board goes beyond its authority when it seeks, as it has been accused of doing, to "force people into unions."
See
Even if one were to acknowledge that authorization cards were "validly" obtained, in the sense that an election held on the very day of a demand for recognition would produce a union majority an acknowledgement that would not be routinely warranted-there is an interest in withholding the polling of employees until there has been a campaign. First of all, the choice of a bargaining representative is a sufficiently weighty decision that it should be made with some ceremony.5° Cards can be collected one at a time, in small groups, or at a meeting, as best suits the tactics of the or ganizer. There is no assurance that an employee, even if he freely believes at the moment that he wishes to have the union represent S. 96, 99-100 (1954) . 5!. Compare the somewhat similar argument in favor of permitting a minority union to picket prior to an election: "Insistence upon an election [prior to enjoining picketing] is a matter of jurisdictional propriety in the sense that ... an election is much the most reliable test of employee sentiment, but it also goes to the meaning of freedom of choice." Cox, Some Cunen t Problems in Labor Law: An Appraisal, 35 L.R.R.i\L 48, 56 (1954) .
52. I think it clear that the rationale underlying the Board's current view is not that summarized in the preceding paragraph of the text. The uncertain scope of H. & W. Construction, see note 48 supra, makes precision difficult, but the Board is apparently reluctant to accept the notion that a campaign is a desirable pre lude to an expression of employee choice. It rather seems concerned with the purity of heart of the employer: Was he honestly uncertain where his duty lay? Considering the elusiveness of the many relevant factual issues and the controvcrsiality of the concept of "uncoerced majority," tha t concern seems the least weighty. One is not branded to me to rest on a serious misstatement of the attitude of the statute toward the spread of collective bargaining and on an inappropriate romanticizing about employee free choice and its relevance to what actually goes on when employees are asked to vote for or against unionization.
As to the first-a matter which is or ought to be of the deepest political controversy-it is simply not so that prior to 194 7 the act sought to encourage collective bargaining but that it does so no more. All that happened in 1947 was that Congress gave recogn ition acknowledging a right to insist on an election provided certain conditions were met, e.g., an employer petition , agreement on a prompt election, consen t to Teasonablc rcstrictio1's on the vo lume and content of campaign propaganda, prompt adjudica tion of challenges to disciplinary action? Our traditional hostility to Board law-makina (whether by rule or decision) inhibits such developments, and makes more difEcul� a sensitive resolution of difficu lt issues.
text, that they join veterans' organizations, political parties, churches, or bowling leagues. If they are supporting coll ective bargaining in an attempt to exert increased economic pressure against their em ployer, he might influence their decision by arguing-this is called "pointing out the disavantages" of organization-that such pressure will be ineffectual or self-defeating, or will be met by counter-pres sures which might leave the employees worse off than before. I am thinking, obviously, of the employer's right under the law to refuse to make concessions, to take a strike, to lock out, and to subject strikers to the risk of permanent loss of their jobs to replacements.
The fact is that we have a dual regime in our labor law: We attempt to insulate employees from economic pressure affecting their deci sion whether or not to bargain collectively, but we build our scheme of collective bargaining on the foundation of economic power.50
The governing principle, to adapt Professor Cox's happy aphorism to this context, is: "To the lion belongs the lion's share."60 We delude ourselves, however, when we begin to think of these com· partments as watertight, and the election campaign is the spot at which the point of leakage is to be found. 61. \Vhen I speak of such an "earlier preference," I assume that the rules regulat ing the gathering of authorization cards arc the product (as they now are not, see text accompanying notes 23-29 Sll/Jm) of a sustained and discriminating efTort to kccp abuses a n d inadequacies within acceptable limits. If this condition is met, employees are not being •·forced into unions."
62. Cf. Secretary ·wirtz's v iews, in Hearings, supra note 2, :H 25. The argument that § S(c) guarantees an em p loye r an o p ponun i ty to campaign prior to being compelled w bargain with a union is one contention which could be made within t h is frame \,·ork. The argument that the 0iLRA is e n ti rely indifferent to the spread of unioniza-
